Le Rwanda a répondu à ces sanctions en annonçant la rupture des relations diplomatiques avec son ancienne puissance coloniale, la Belgique, donnant 48 heures à ses diplomates pour quitter le territoire rwandais. Les raisons de cette mesure rwandaise dénonçant des « tentatives pitoyables de la Belgique de maintenir ses illusions néocoloniales » ont été détaillées la veille par le Président rwandais Paul Kagame qui accuse la Belgique d’avoir conduit un véritable lobbying au niveau européen et international en vue d’obtenir ces sanctions visant le Rwanda.

Il convient, en effet, de souligner que depuis plus de deux ans, les relations entre les deux pays ont été au plus bas avec des refus, belge d’abord, puis rwandais, d’agréer leurs ambassadeurs respectifs. Depuis l’escalade du conflit armé entre le M23/AFC et le gouvernement congolais, notamment l’occupation de Goma fin janvier et Bukavu quelques deux semaines plus tard, sur fond de tensions entre la RDC et le Rwanda, la Belgique semble s’être rangée du côté des autorités congolaises. Le 18 février 2025, le Rwanda avait déjà pris le devant en annonçant la suspension de la coopération au développement, renonçant ainsi à l’assistance que le pays recevait de la Belgique, suite justement aux démarches belges visant, notamment, à obtenir les sanctions qui viennent d’être annoncées.

Au moment où ces sanctions européennes prônées par le gouvernement belge sont certainement applaudies à Kinshasa, il convient de s’interroger sur l’impact qu’elles auront sur le terrain des hostilités de l’est de la RDC. En effet, malgré que la liste d’acteurs et entités sanctionnés en rapport avec le conflit à l’est de la RDC depuis les deux dernières décennies soit longue, elles semblent ne pas être en mesure de prévenir la récurrence des conflits armés en RDC. Des fois, ces sanctions sont même exploitées par des personnes visées, telles que Bitakwira, pour légitimer leur statut d’acteur politique national à travers un mélange de populisme et de discours de haine anti-Tutsi. Ce dernier fut élu parlementaire de l’Union sacrée du Président Tshisekedi après des sanctions européennes. De même, Yakutumba, également sanctionné par l’Union Européenne a récemment été investi par les autorités congolaises comme coordinateur des Wazalendo dans le Sud-Kivu, lesquels Wazalendo contrôlent et font la loi aujourd’hui dans la Ville d’Uvira. Il convient de rappeler que le conflit dans cette province de la RDC a commencé en 2017, bien avant la résurgence du M23/AFC.

De ce fait, par son attitude tranchée dans le conflit RDC-M23-Rwanda, la Belgique, de par son histoire d’ancienne puissance colonisatrice des deux pays en question, se retrouve dans une position paradoxalement délicate. L’option de se focaliser sur les arguments légalistes portant sur la violation de la souveraineté de la RDC par le Rwanda, la Belgique, comme d’autres acteurs tels que l’Union Européenne et les États Unis, évitent de se pencher sur les causes historiques profondes des conflits armées et motivations des différents acteurs. Cette posture permet également à la Belgique d’adopter une posture de champion d’un Congo martyrisé lui permettant d’éviter un regard introspectif sur son propre rôle de semeur du logiciel identitaire Hutu-Tutsi-Twa, Bantou-Nilotiques/Hamites qui sous-tend les dimensions internes et régionales des conflits à l’est de la RDC. Après tout, c’est cette même Belgique voulant jouer un rôle moralisateur dans un conflit aux dimensions locales, nationales et régionales complexes qui peine encore à faire face à son propre passé dans la région, comme en témoigne l’impasse politique quant à la suite à donner aux travaux de la « Commission Congo » sur le passé colonial. Les tensions actuelles entre le Rwanda et la Belgique sont loin de favoriser un traitement adéquat de toutes les questions de fond qui, de près ou de loin, ont une incidence sur le conflit actuel.

Il convient de noter que l’annonce des sanctions européennes intervient au moment où des efforts diplomatiques de la médiation angolaise mais aussi des communautés de l’Afrique de l’est (EAC) et de l’Afrique Australe (SADC) semblent devaient mener sur la voie d’une première rencontre entre les représentants du gouvernement et de du M23/AFC à Luanda ce 18 Mars 2025. Après avoir confirmé sa participation et désigné une délégation, le M23/AFC a annulé par participation, invoquant cette annonce européenne des sanctions. Au-delà des considérations d’ordre idéologique, il est difficile de concevoir un justificatif rationnel de cette annonce des sanctions à la veille des pourparlers. Quel impact à long terme auront ces mesures prises sur le continent européen sur les initiatives africaines reste une question ouverte ? L’exemple du conflit libyen nous enseigne que des interventions non coordonnées entre acteurs occidentaux et africains peuvent des fois mener aux pires scénarios.

L’enterrement du Capitaine Gisore Rukatura, alias Kabongo, était prévu pour ce 23 novembre 2023, sur base d’un accord entre les autorités militaires de la province et la famille de la victime. En date du 9 novembre 2023, cet officier dans l’armée congolaise fut lynché en pleine journée dans un quartier de Goma. Des images de la scène partagées sur des réseaux sociaux sont traumatisantes : elles montrent une victime encore vivante mais ensanglanté, puis un corps sans vie, mutilé, brûlé et, selon certains rapports, cannibalisé par une foule dont les actes de deshumanisation de la victime reflètent autant un reniement de l’humanité de la victime que de celle des auteurs du forfait.

Le 23 novembre, la famille s’est présentée, avec toutes les autorisations nécessaires, à la morgue du camp militaire où le corps lynché reposait, mais les responsables du service lui ont signifié que le corps a déjà été enterré. Selon les sources sur le terrain, cet enterrement en catimini, en l’absence de l’épouse, des enfants et des proches de la victime, violait toutes les règles d’humanité et constituait une profonde source de revictimisation. Après de longues tractations, le corps fut déterré, puis remis à la famille qui procéda à un enterrement digne. Les promesses faites par les autorités congolaises, qui avaient brisé leur mutisme habituel face à des actes similaires en condamnant le lynchage du Capitaine Gisore et promettant des sanctions contre les personnes responsables, n’ont pas été traduites en actes concrets, malgré l’existence des vidéos montrant des personnes impliquées dans le forfait.

Quoi qu’étant un membre régulier des forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) portant les séquelles de son service militaire (ayant perdu un bras sur le front), il fut lynché sous prétexte qu’il appartiendrait au M23 de par son appartenance à la Communauté Tutsi-Banyamulenge. Il importe de souligner que la victime vivait avec une femme de l’ethnie Hunde avec laquelle il avait trois enfants. Il laisse également derrière 5 enfants par un mariage antérieur. Son vécu représentait l’antithèse même du contenu du discours de haine ambiant en RDC en relation avec le conflit sanglant.

Au moment où l’attention des acteurs qui comptent le plus sur la scène globale est rivée sur les situations tragiques au Moyen-Orient (Israël-Gaza) et en Ukraine agressée par la Russie, les conflits armés et actes de violence à l’est de la DRC s’intensifient dans une relative indifférence. Dans la foulée du lynchage du Capitaine Gasore, plusieurs messages avaient été partagés sur les réseaux sociaux justifiant ou rationalisant l’acte visant ce que les auteurs qualifient d’ennemi naturel de la RDC. Ce lynchage du Capitaine Gisore Rukatura rappelle celui d’autres forfaits similaires notamment celui du Major Kaminzobe et intervient dans un climat délétère de détérioration de la situation sécuritaire à l’est de la RDC, particulièrement dans la province du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu. Après une période d’accalmie suite au déploiement de la force de la Communauté est africaine, la reprise des hostilités entre les forces gouvernementales et allies contre le M23 relègue les processus de paix dit de Nairobi et Luanda vers des horizons lointaines.

Pour rappel, le processus de Nairobi ayant conduit au déploiement de la force régionale envisageait une désescalade progressive du conflit combinant un arrêt des hostilités et un désengagement des belligérants mais également des pourparlers politiques devant mener vers des solutions durables. Celles-ci supposaient un désarmement de tous les groupes armés aussi bien locaux qu’étrangers et des garanties sécuritaires devant permettre aux communautés, y compris les déplacés et réfugiés, de vivre en paix sur leurs terres et d’adhérer à des mécanismes de résolution pacifique des différends, y compris fonciers et identitaires. Divers pourparlers de Luanda, impliquant les hautes autorités de la RDC, du Rwanda et, de l’Ouganda poursuivaient les mêmes objectifs avec un accent prononcé sur les dimensions interétatiques à la source des tensions entre la RDC et les voisins Rwandais (et Ougandais), notamment les accusations mutuelles de soutien aux groupes armées FDLR dans le premier cas et M23 dans ce dernier.

Depuis le déploiement de la force de l’EAC, le climat politique a considérablement changé. Surfant sur les sentiments, certes légitimes, de colère d’une population qui en a marre des cycles interminables de conflits et violences, les autorités congolaises ont versé plutôt dans le populisme en rejetant toute forme de négociation avec le groupe M23 qu’elles accusent, avec le Rwanda, comme étant le principal, si pas la seule, source des maux qui rongent cette partie du pays depuis plus de trois décennies. La logique adoptée par les autorités congolaises de vaincre le M23 sur le champ de bataille semble avoir paralysé la force de l’EAC et de la MONUSCO déployées dans la région mais aussi divisé certains de ces acteurs quant à l’attitude à adopter face à la radicalisation du conflit. Sommée par les autorités congolaises à quitter le territoire congolais, la Force de l’EAC a initié un rapatriement de ses troupes.

La majorité des 266 groupes armés locaux et étrangers dont le désarmement constituait l’objectif ultime du déploiement de l’ EAC ont désormais été plutôt légitimés par les autorités comme étant des partenaires dans ce combat. La banalisation du discours nativiste Wazalendo (autochtones, patriotes) dont se réclament nombre de groupes armés locaux dans les provinces du Nord Kivu et du Sud Kivu ne contribue pas à apaiser les tensions entres les communautés compte tenu du passif des réclamations identitaires et dynamiques d’exclusion nationale que véhicule son contenu. L’usage et approvisionnement des groupes armés pour combattre d’autres groupes armés, le recours assumé aux mercenaires et l’adoption d’une logique visant à multiplier les intervenants (référence à la d’un déploiement de la Communauté Économique de l’Afrique Australe-SADC) sont autant des facteurs qui hypothèquent les efforts visant à minimiser la souffrance et les pertes des vies humaines dans cette partie du pays.

Nous avons précédemment analysé les dynamiques du discours de haine, la normalisation des théories de complot et la subjectivisation victimaire et la culpabilisation collective. Le lynchage du Capitaine Gisore Rukatura et actes similaires sont une suite logique d’un discours de diabolisation du Tutsi (mais aussi d’autres communautés suite à la ferveur électorale) par divers acteurs y compris des responsables au sommet de l’état qui ne cessent de répéter que l’armée congolaise est infiltrée, pour justifier sa mauvaise performance sur le terrain. Malgré de multiples rapports, y compris par les Nations Unies, montrant que la majorité des violations des droits humains sont commises par des forces de l’ordre et des groupes armés, notamment les Wazalendo, deux ministres nationaux se proclamaient récemment Wazalendo ! À ces réalités dictées par un climat d’insécurité accentué par les élections générales prévues pour décembre 2023. Les narratives d’exclusion, de diabolisation et de délégitimation ne font que renouer avec des vieux démons identitaires qui ont accompagné des précédents cycles électoraux, dont 2006, 2011 (ex. Kabila, Zongisa ye na Rwanda).

La RDC, scène du conflit, et la région qui en est affectée se trouvent désormais face à un choix clair : poursuivre la résolution du conflit par les voies militaires ou à travers un processus de paix tenant compte des prescriptions de Nairobi, Luanda, mais également du contenu des précédents efforts de paix. La première solution a été testée à plusieurs reprises mais n’a pas généré de solutions à long terme. La dernière serait, de toute évidence, lente mais aurait l’avantage de faire l’économie des vies humaines et de minimiser la souffrance dans un pays qui, avec près de 7 millions, compte actuellement le plus grand nombre de déplacés internes selon l’OIM.

The M23/AFC, on the other hand, responded to the EU sanctions by pulling out of talks with DRC authorities scheduled in Luanda on the day after the sanctions were announced. In effect, the announcement of the European sanctions at this crucial time, despite protests of African countries, doomed the Luanda talks, before new initiatives by Qatar and the United States revived the peace talks, just as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) were still outlining the contours of their own mediation efforts.

The sources of contention between Rwandan and Belgian authorities appear to be less about the sanctions – after all, other Western countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, took similar steps – than the politics leading up to their adoption. Rwanda denounced the Belgian role in mobilizing other actors, including within the European Union, to sanction Rwanda. A note entitled “Brief historical timeline: Belgium in Rwanda” issued by the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the day of the severance of diplomatic ties drew a parallel between the lobbying for sanctions in 2025 and the “very active diplomatic campaign” for a total withdrawal of the UNAMIR Mission from Rwanda in 1994. Recent events should also be read as a tipping point in a crisis that had been brewing for the last couple of years. In mid-2023, it was reported that Belgium was withholding the accreditation of the Rwandan Ambassador-designate to Brussels. Rwanda retaliated by rejecting the appointment of a Belgian citizen as an EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and, later, withholding the accreditation of a new Belgian ambassador to Rwanda.

Belgian officials framed their position as a principled defence of DRC’s territorial integrity and humanistic values: the Belgian Foreign Minister stated that the unique compass guiding Belgian conduct was respect for human rights, rule of law, and international humanitarian law. To the Rwandan authorities’ charge of Belgian “neocolonial illusions”, the Foreign Minister opposed a recognition of a complex colonial past “from which [Belgium] has long distanced itself”. The statement arguably refers to the work of the “Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Rwanda” in 1997 and the apology in 2000 by then Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt for Belgian failures during the genocide.

The current diplomatic crisis clearly demonstrates that the past lives in the present in Belgium’s dealings with former colonies, not only in the realm of memory but also in response to current crises. The diplomatic row raises questions over the effectiveness of responses to the conflicts in Eastern Congo by diverse actors, including Belgium. It further highlights the complex, deep-rooted, and interconnected factors playing a role in violence in the region and reveals the limits of transitional justice theory and practice.

The wording of European sanctions held the Rwandan army (RDF) responsible for a military intervention in the DRC that sustained “the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the region”. This reading of the situation builds on reports from international actors documenting Rwanda’s involvement in eastern DRC and statements by the Congolese authorities presenting the M23/AFC as an empty shell devoid of any legitimate claims or grievances. Some accounts even commonly present the conflict as masking hegemonic or economic, particularly mineral interests of Rwanda in eastern Congo. Narratives on the balkanisation of the DRC recycled over the last three decades, even beyond, are accompanied by unsubstantiated allegations by Congolese authorities of a “gradual depopulation of certain strategic territories, followed by their repopulation by foreign populations established by Rwanda”.

Rwandan authorities admit having taken, in their words, defensive measures to address threats originating from the DRC. They have repeatedly denounced the collaboration between Congolese security forces with Rwandan rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), who, under different shapes, have used Congolese soil to organise, arm, and periodically launch attacks on Rwandan soil over the last three decades. They further denounce the belligerent rhetoric of several Congolese authorities vowing to take the war to Kigali, topple the government, and turn Rwanda into a DRC province. The use of harsh, combative language by top authorities in both countries suggests a difficult road ahead in seeking de-escalation and, eventually, a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

Sanctions are understood as “a penalty or punishment imposed as a means of enforcing obedience to a law”. Under the European system, sanctions, including financial sanctions, trade sanctions, and travel bans, are imagined as tools for the promotion of common foreign and security policy objectives of “peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and international law”. The timing of the European sanctions targeting Rwandan and M23 actors, against the backdrop of diplomatic efforts towards a negotiated settlement, raised questions over the sincerity of European commitment to the stated goals. A closer examination of the loaded history of conflicts and the use of sanctions targeting specific actors raises doubt over the effectiveness of coercive power in pursuit of peace.

The conflict in eastern DRC carries multiple layers, with local, national, regional, and global dimensions. Dominant narratives in the media attribute the current wave of insecurity in Eastern DRC to a re-emergence of the M23 since November 2021, with Rwanda’s support. While the armed conflict has intensified since then, this narrow reading of the situation is reductive in many ways. First, as discussed elsewhere, much of the conflict that destroyed the South Kivu highlands around Minembwe occurred between 2017 and early 2021, that is, before the active re-emergence of the M23. During the same period, one of the deadliest conflicts in Eastern Congo, the conflict in Ituri re-ignited, with a revolting regularity of large-scale massacres by groups such as CODECO and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Until the formal announcement of the co-option of violent Mai Mai and other militias by President Tshisekedi’s administration in early March 2023, with the institution of the Réserve Armée de la Défense, studies inventoried around 120 different armed groups in the Kivus alone. The DRC’s demobilization office reported a larger figure of 266 essentially local, with few foreign, armed groups in five eastern provinces (North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Ituri, and Tanganyika). In 2023, representatives of several armed groups took part in the Nairobi peace process until a policy shift by Congolese authorities led to the co-option of Mai Mai groups and the arming of civilians to fight the M23 in North Kivu and Twirwaneho in South Kivu.

Second, the Nairobi peace initiative spearheaded by the East African Community was essentially derailed, and conflict escalated, after Congolese authorities labelled the M23 as a terrorist organisation and excluded it from participation in the negotiated Nairobi process, vowing to defeat it on the battlefield. The large majority of local Mai Mai and other armed groups, whose disarmament featured as the core objective of the Nairobi process, were sanitized by Congolese authorities and formally recognized as partners in defence of territorial integrity against foreign (Rwandan) aggression. In March 2023, the current Minister of Rural Development, Muhindo Nzangi, lifted any ambiguity on the policy shift: “You no longer need to hide! From now onwards, you are no longer negative forces! You are becoming reservists”, he told Mai Mai militias.

The christening of these militia under the more “exotic” and palatable name Wazalendo epitomizes the dangers and contradictions of a populist governance in conflict. According to the Kamusi Teule ya Kiswahili (Swahili Dictionary), a Mzalendo (sing.), Wazalendo (plur.) is a “(1) a person born in a certain place; a person who is a native and inhabitant of a certain place…;(2) a person who loves his country and is willing to die for it”. The virtual erasure of violent Mai Mai pasts and reinvention into native patriots (wazalendo) carries the germs of contextually familiar politics of exclusion targeting the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda across DRC’s post-colonial history.

Two, among many, examples are invoked here to illustrate the questionable choices made: William Yakutumba, a South Kivu warlord, has led armed militias in South Kivu for nearly two decades, variably fighting the government and other armed actors. Placed under EU and UN sanctions for, among others, “illicit trade and exploitation of natural resources, and the commission of human rights abuses in the DRC, including rape, mass rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence [and] attacking Banyamulenge civilians”, Yakutumba was recently tasked by Congolese authorities, reportedly acting on instructions of President Tshisekedi, to lead Wazalendo in the Fizi-Uvira-Mwenga region.

Whereas Yakutumba is vested with a “patriotic mission” to save the homeland against foreign aggression, as the now canonical creed in contemporary DRC narratives goes, Justin Bitakwira, another EU-sanctioned individual, acts as the political face of the nativist discourses embodied by the Wazalendo phenomenon. According to his own statements and actions, he has crisscrossed the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu on a mission from the highest authority in the land to organize and reinforce the capacity of Mai Mai warlords under their new Wazalendo clothes. He is on record frequently deriding the impact of European sanctions, using them, instead, to boost his populist credentials. He campaigned with President Tshisekedi and was elected to the national parliament in 2024, after being sanctioned for public speeches that “repeatedly incited violence and encouraged discrimination and hostility towards the Banyamulenge community, which has been targeted and attacked by armed groups”. When the DRC government decided to “legalize” violent Mai Mai groups, I asked a prominent European ambassador in Kinshasa whether he, as a DRC development partner, supported the policy. He replied that he received and believed the assurances from Congolese authorities that they would not collaborate with armed militias. The absence of condemnation of the open and formalized collaboration of the government with militias with violent pasts suggests that DRC partners have made a calculated, if tacit, decision to accommodate that reality.

Over the last three decades, different peace processes and agreements have elaborated on the causes of conflicts and grievances from diverse actors that feed into cycles of conflicts. Claims over land and territorial rights, equal citizenship and participation rights, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, as well as equal opportunity and access, are some of the recurrent domestic issues variably playing a role in insecurity in the region. Moreover, disarmament and reintegration of local armed groups and the incapacitation and repatriation of foreign armed actors operating on Congolese soil have featured in the diverse agreements and roadmaps for peace over the years.

Due to its troubled colonial past in the Great Lakes region, Belgium’s involvement in contemporary domestic and regionalized conflicts requires a delicate balancing act. There are historical and moral reasons commanding caution in the deployment of political agency in resolving the current conflicts and realizing the promises of justice for present and past wrongs. First, Belgium still struggles to face its own colonial legacy, including atrocities and policies that had an indelible mark on local societies. Contestations over how the colonial past is remembered, taught, and lived in the present, whether in Belgium or within former colonies, remain deep. Sources of contention cover such diverse hot topics as the nature of Leopoldian atrocities, the assassination of Lumumba, the Katangese secession, the manipulation of ethnic politics in Ruanda-Urundi, including questionable or suspicious removals or deaths of key leaders, and the broad, lasting impact of colonisation on societies within and across state boundaries. The political saga around the initially celebrated establishment of a commission to investigate Belgian colonial past – whose report was eventually shelved due to political disagreements over what to do with findings – encapsulates the residual challenges Belgium faces some sixty-plus years since the formal decolonisation. The process revealed that Belgium was still internally unable to lucidly process the colonial past, let alone embark on a path of construction of shared memories and repair.

Second, the legacy of the colonial policies does not only live in the past but rather has an impact on the present. To use a metaphor borrowed from the computer language, the hardware (in the sense of physical actors) of recent conflicts may essentially consist of local, but the identitarian software feeding them has a Belgian colonial imprint. Narratives on “Bantu” autochthony at the heart of the Wazalendo movement directed against alien “Nilotic” Tutsi or Banyamulenge invaders have roots in the Belgian colonial library. In other words, the legacy of Belgian ethnic and territorial governance informs many contemporary claims, grievances, and narratives of exclusion that feed conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

Zooming back to the Belgium-Rwanda diplomatic crisis, the Belgian foreign minister stated that Rwanda’s severing of diplomatic ties was a “disproportionate” (and later emotional rather than rational) decision, showing that “when we disagree with Rwanda, they prefer not to engage in dialogue”. A reading of the Rwandan official’s reaction to Belgian lobbying for sanctions against the background of policies undertaken in the country over the last three decades suggests that sources of tensions between the two countries go deeper than the statement suggests.

As discussed elsewhere, policies undertaken in Rwanda since the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated governmental forces in 1994 have been wrapped into an ideology that defines itself in opposition to the Belgian colonial legacy. These include reversing the institutionalisation of ethnicity as a pillar of socio-political governance and institutional reforms steering the country towards neighbouring anglophone countries, including replacing French with English as the main foreign language used in the country’s education, administration, and international exchanges. A Rwandanisation praxis undergirding these policies adopts a decolonial language: policies seek to reconnect with cultural roots eroded by the mirroring operation of the colonial project. Rwanda’s distancing from the colonial inheritance does not facilitate a renegotiation of relations with Belgium, mostly the Belgian Francophone establishment. The statement of the Francophone Belgian Foreign Minister during a recent visit to the Great Lakes that “we do not have any feeling of past colonialism regrets” illustrates the still bumpy, long road ahead in the construction of a shared, peaceful memorialisation of the past.

The posture of some Belgian officials as defenders of the DRC in international relations is not devoid of raw realpolitikal calculations, as the adopted narratives suggest. The country has a sizable diaspora population from the Great Lakes, particularly the DRC, that is increasingly politically active, including in the country’s party politics, inviting their positionality vis-à-vis conflicts in their countries of origin into the Belgian political frame. Moreover, Congolese authorities have courted the Belgian authorities and private sector, particularly from Wallonia, to invest in the DRC in diverse sectors of the economy. President Tshisekedi and many members of his administration lived in Belgium and have a personal connection with to country: their pursuit of appeased relations with Belgium conforms to the view that all politics is personal. This represents a change from the fluctuating DRC-Belgium relations under Joseph Kabila. Interestingly, tensions between the two countries in the late years of Kabila’s rule featured contestations over the use of … sanctions by the EU as an instrument of pressure over members of Kabila’s administration. Tensions led Kabila to say, “There are people in Belgium who believe that the Congo is still a colony,”; a statement reminiscent of Rwanda’s recent communications.

I started documenting the correlated dynamics of violence and hate speech by diverse actors in relation to the conflicts in eastern Congo in 2019. I published short articles and later an academic article elaborating on the dynamics of violence, actors, and forms of hate speech. Much of this early work mainly focused on events in South Kivu until mid-2022, that is, before the critical escalation of the conflict in North Kivu opposing the DRC government coalition to the M23 and allies. The crux of my argument has consistently been that the absence of a holistic peacebuilding mechanism to address local, domestic, and regionalized sources of insecurity and violence across decades is a major factor in conflict recurrence in eastern DRC. Responses by major players in the region, including Belgium, to the current crisis in eastern DRC and the resulting tensions between the country and Rwanda fit into a predictable frame: instead of investing in addressing the interconnected sources of recurring conflicts, many actors opt for partial interventions that best align with their strategic interests.

Addressing the local, national, and regionalised sources of insecurity in eastern DRC and across the borders requires a holistic approach that, arguably, cannot be achieved through sanctions and patronizing approaches to peacebuilding and justice. The difficult quest for lasting peace and justice requires sincere dialogues all past, present, local, regional, and global factors that play a role in the outbreak or recurrence of conflicts are addressed. This requires a rethinking of what a comprehensive transitional justice could and can realistically achieve within and across state boundaries. Looking beyond the Great Lakes context, the difficult dialogue between France and former Western colonies in North and West Africa (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad) shows that the historically unequal structures defining such interactions are increasingly approached as part of the contemporary frontiers of decolonization.

While the dynamics of conflict in the equally troubled adjacent North Kivu and Ituri provinces are widely documented, conflicts in South Kivu have attracted comparatively limited global attention. Peace and stability for the local population, eastern DRC, and the wider region remain a far-removed aspiration due to the absence of comprehensive - and most importantly, localized - peacebuilding efforts geared towards addressing sources of tensions that create an enabling environment for the proliferation of armed groups. The absence of credible initiatives to promote social cohesion between communities is deplorable since the DRC hosts the biggest UN field deployment in the world – the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – composed of over 20,000 personnel at a yearly cost of over 1 billion USD, as per the 2019-2020 budget(4). There are several intertwined factors to renewed belligerency involving a plethora of actors in this volatile region of eastern DRC. The present piece seeks to explain the sources and dynamics of recent conflicts, as well as the actors involved. The analysis will further propose ideas on the steps that should be taken to restore peace and stability.

First, renewed violence and insecurity build on long-standing local identity politics and nativist discourses in the DRC, most saliently in the two Kivu provinces. For several decades, conflicts in South Kivu have opposed members of the Babembe, Bafuliru, Banyindu, and Bavira ethnic groups (self-styled autochthones) to the Banyamulenge. Belgian colonial manipulation of traditional governance institutions known as chieftaincies cemented communal land and territorial rights claims of some communities over others. Narratives of autochthony by the Babembe, Bafuliru, Banyindu, and Bavira - and to some extent Balega and Bashi – are framed in opposition to the Banyamulenge, whose disenfranchisement under colonial governance deprived them of institutional tools that came to define local legitimacy.

The Banyamulenge are a mainly Tutsi, historically pastoralist community established in eastern DRC before the demarcation of the country’s boundaries and Belgian colonial rule over the territory. The precise time of their settlement in the DRC is often subject to emotional debates. A composite community formed out of several waves of pre-colonial migrations from Rwanda, Burundi, and possibly elsewhere in the region, their ancestors crossed the Ruzizi River with herds of livestock and settled in the territory that later became the South Kivu province of the DRC.

Belgian divide and rule policies, particularly colonial manipulation of the institution of chieftaincies, laid the foundations of their future political marginality by recognizing and then abolishing their traditional authorities that carried an entitlement to communal land rights of ethnic communities. Because of this institutional disenfranchisement, colonial historiography is often used by their “autochthones” detractors to back claims that the Banyamulenge are alien to the DRC and should return to neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda, their attributed natural home. It is not therefore surprising that the erection of Banyamuelnge controlled Minembwe into an Administrative Commune in 2013 - out of some 507 other such entities created across the country, including 25 in South Kivu - is being used by militias from the Babembe, Bafuliru and Banyindu communities as a rallying cry in a fight framed as aimed at, among others, preventing the usurpation of their territorial rights by former.

Second, since Congolese independence, but most pointedly the 1996 First Congo War, eastern Congo, including South Kivu, has been a fertile ground for armed groups, both local and foreign. This is the region that hosted the iconic Che Guevara at the height of the Simba-Mulele rebellion of 1963-1956 that broke out in reaction to the assassination of the emblematic Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who presided over the country’s decolonization. Fast-forward to 1996, the very first shots that started the Congo war of 1996 – opposing what came to be labelled as the Banyamulenge insurgents backed by Rwanda to Zairian forces sent by Mobutu to dislodge them - were fired in this particular area(5).

Since then, the proliferation of weapons has fueled the emergence of several, often ethnicity-based, local armed militias. Yet, despite a continuous presence of various armed groups and frequent episodes of killings and other atrocities, this zone had managed to avoid generalized violence in comparison with, for instance, the North Kivu or Ituri provinces of eastern DRC. Things seem to be changing, though, for the worse. An August 2019 update by the Congo Research Group of New York University identified more than 130 armed groups in the two Kivu provinces, including 82 groups operating in the South Kivu province(6).

Comparisons with previous reports by the same authors reveal a tremendous increase in the number of armed groups, particularly in the latter province(7). Numerous causes and dynamics shape the emergence of these armed groups. Enabling factors are: the collapse of the state, its inability to project power, secure the territory, and perform its basic functions of catering to the needs of the population. The void created by the absence of the state is filled by armed groups that live on the backs of local populations. Joining armed groups has become an attractive option for the youth in an environment where life prospects are limited and the survival of the fittest is the norm.

When the hardly remunerated, untrained, and thus, generally undisciplined, Congolese regular forces – Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) - intervene in terrains of hostilities, they often become part of the problem rather than the solution. Recent accounts have denounced FARDC racketeering practices against the local population in the Minembwe area, where they are currently deployed to quell the ongoing armed violence. Accusations range from collusion with militias in looting livestock to confiscation of money, telephones, clothing, and the like from civilians(8).

Third, the presence of foreign armed groups significantly shapes the dynamics of conflict on the ground and in the region. Over the last 25 years, since the defeat of the Rwandan government that presided over the genocide against the country’s Tutsi population, vanquished elements of the Rwandan Armed Forces and militias have organized various rebellions using the Kivu provinces of the DRC, bordering Rwanda, as operational bases. Currently organized under several armed movements, most notably the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and splinter groups such as the Conseil National pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie(9), they have constantly constituted a factor of local instability in North and South Kivu and a source of diplomatic frictions across the region. In more recent years, reports have also documented the presence of armed elements supportive of Rwandan former Chief of Staff Kayumba Nyamwasa, who, under the Rwandan National Congress (RNC), has been organizing and leading an armed opposition against Rwandan authorities from his South African exile.

FDLR and RNC’s armed activities are at the heart of the fraught relations between Rwanda and its neighbours: Burundi and Uganda. South Kivu is also the only Congolese province bordering Burundi. For several decades, the province has been used by armed groups fighting successive Burundian governments. Since the crisis and renewed violence that broke out in Burundi in 2015 in response to contestations surrounding constitutional changes allowing President Pierre Nkurunziza to remain in power, the DRC has become a main terrain of armed hostilities between Burundian protagonists involved in the crisis. These include: the Résistance pour un Etat de Droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara), the Forces Nationales de Libération-FNL-Nzabampema, and the Forces Républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU)(10). The June 2019 report of the UN Group of experts on the DRC documented incursions in South Kivu of the regular Burundian army - the Forces de Défense Nationale du Burundi (FDN) - and the Imbonerakure militia supportive of the CNDD-FDD ruling party(11). The presence of these foreign armed groups on Congolese soil represents an additional source of victimization for the local population. It is a bait or pretext for armies from their countries of origin to intervene in the DRC, whether directly or via proxies, on the pretext of failure by local and international actors to disarm and completely remove the threats these groups represent.

The prevailing rule of the jungle in South Kivu, other eastern DRC provinces (North Kivu, Ituri, and even Tanganyika), but also elsewhere in the country, such as in the Kasai provinces, has kept the local population in a climate of constant insecurity and fear. Over the years, thousands of people from all ethnic communities were left with no choice but to leave everything behind and seek refuge in countries across the region, where they continue to live in precarious conditions without any hope for a better tomorrow. According to August 2019 UNHCR data, there were 886,910 Congolese refugees/asylum seekers in African countries, including 376,111 in Uganda, 80,897 in Burundi, 77,833 in Tanzania, and 76,375 in Rwanda. North Kivu and South Kivu were listed as the top provinces of origin of refugees(12). UNHCR data further show that the DRC “has the largest displaced population in Africa with more than 4.5 million internally displaced persons” (13). The number of casualties of cycles of conflicts over the last quarter of a century has constantly been debated, but they are often estimated in the millions (14). The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs states that 12.8 million people in the DRC, a country with, arguably, the highest agricultural potential in Africa, “are facing severe food insecurity” (15).

From what precedes, the rising violence in South Kivu is symptomatic of the troubled situation of the country. Responses to the conflict in the DRC require holistic efforts to tackle local, national, regional, and even international dimensions of the protracted DRC conflicts. Otherwise, partial solutions can only lead to partial results. DRC authorities have the primary responsibility to address the ongoing crises in South Kivu and elsewhere. However, given the prevailing political instability, ongoing power struggle at the top, and governmental inability for decades to assert authority and address the pressing needs of Congolese citizens, international actors active in the DRC have a role to play in steering Congolese authorities to undertake needed reforms. Global narratives on, and interventions in, the DRC over the last more than two decades have focused on building national institutions, curbing gender-based violence, and controlling the illegal exploitation of minerals(16). A considerable international investment in the country over the years, through MONUSCO and bilateral and multilateral assistance schemes, has mostly focused on these identified priorities. While addressing these issues remains very relevant, lasting peace can only be a realizable dream if there are credible initiatives that address not only the symptoms but, more importantly, the diseases that have plagued the DRC for several decades. A path to lasting stability in the DRC may require the following:

1. Tackling regional dimensions of conflicts should remain a top priority for peacebuilding endeavors in the DRC. Comparative history and politics show that countries hardly stay idle when faced by armed threats from actors operating from neighboring territories. Beyond legalistic and emotional debates over interventions by Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in the DRC over the years, the absence of forceful disarmament of armed groups from those countries leaves intact the main excuse used by these neighboring countries to openly or, often covertly, intervene with or without DRC governmental consent. The new Tshisekedi administration seems willing to talk to neighbors on ways to address these threats, as evidenced by his visits to the various regional capitals, multiple meetings with their heads of state, and involvement in mediating the conflict between Rwanda and Uganda. Crucially, an improvement of characteristically toxic relations between Congolese and Rwandan authorities initiated before President Kabila stepped down and reinforced since President Felix Tshisekedi took over the presidency is manifested by the recent Killing of the ICC indicted FDLR president Sylvestre Mudacumura, preceded by arrests of the organization’s spokesperson Ignace alias LaForge Fils Bazeye and chief intelligence officer Jean Pierre Nsekanabo alias Abega. Dealing with what is often referred to in the region as “negative forces” in the region is a prerequisite for peace and stability in the DRC and improved relations with its neighbors.

2. Building or strengthening institutions for responsible and accountable governance in the DRC requires continued global support. This support should go beyond national elections, producing cosmetic changes of top national leadership as was recently the case: genuine reforms should target both national and local institutions and address institutionalized corruption and clientelism that, since Mobutu’s rule, has become a way of life. Decentralization initiatives undertaken in recent years, whereby the number of existing provinces was raised from 11 to 26 and new cities and communes were created, are positive steps.

   However, local governance may still require more radical reforms. In particular, the executive powers (beyond the cultural realm) held by unelected, at times hereditary chieftains, something that was prized during Belgian colonial rule, may need to be revisited considering 21st-century imperatives and democratic ideals of accountability. This issue raises emotional debates over acquired communal rights and entitlements to lands and territories. However, as examples in the Kivu provinces show, tensions will remain where nation-building is in constant competition with territorialized ethnic nationalisms in a country where, after all, the land is, by law, a state property.

   De-tribalization of society in Nyerere’s Tanzania offers interesting lessons on peaceful management of plural ethnic identities, compared to other societies such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and the DRC, where the use of ethnicity as a pillar of governance has been characterized by protracted conflicts and a quest for the right balance between competing ethnic and national identities.

3. Genuine reforms of local governance should be accompanied by sustained investment in local peacebuilding. Just as a tree cannot survive with rotten roots, the Congolese state cannot function when local communities are torn by conflicts. The DRC is a country composed of more than 250 ethnic communities. For generations, going back to a period that predates the establishment of Congolese boundaries, neighboring groups lived together and established systems of cooperation often characterized by shared values of good neighborliness in the true, not apartheid(17), sense. The multiplication of violent conflicts between ethnic communities and other identity-based violence in recent years is therefore more of a recent phenomenon linked to the demise of the Congolese state than a product of some atavistic characteristics of involved actors. The growing social fracture is accentuated by the fact that divisions on the ground nurture – but also are nurtured by - dynamics in DRC/Kivu diasporas in, for instance, Europe, North America, and South Africa, where partisan demonstrations have been held denouncing violent actions by the “others”. Local peacebuilding should focus on mending broken bridges between communities.

   Based on the contact theory positing that increased intergroup contacts contribute towards decreases in mutual prejudices, contextualized socio-political and economic cooperative initiatives should be designed to address sources of ethnic and other identity-based divisions. Only then can subjectified “experiences and perceptions of collective victimhood”(18) give place to shared memories and a search for common grounds for a shared, better, and peaceful future. This inclusive peacebuilding requires identifying and linking actors that are willing to cross partisan lines in pursuit of peace.

4. The international community should ensure that its interventions in the DRC are leading to the achievement of all these goals. The country is endowed with riches that should guarantee a decent life for every Congolese. Unleashing the untapped potential of the DRC through rational, fair use and distribution of its resources within a stable and uncorrupt environment would turn the DRC into an engine for growth on the continent. Hence, local peacebuilding, strengthening national institutions, reforming local governance for more accountability, and fostering regional cooperation should all feature in any credible global peace agenda for the DRC. Otherwise, no level of investment in “stabilization” of the DRC – to use the operative word in the name of the UN mission in the country – will achieve lasting results.

The European Union and individual European countries are among the key players that have heavily contributed, at least financially, to peace initiatives in the DRC. Like any other investment, European and other actors need to ensure that their resources are serving the right imperatives and are likely to produce lasting peace in the DRC. Failure to tackle the different dimensions and layers of the protracted conflicts in South Kivu, Eastern Congo, the whole country, and region somewhat justifies perceptions that the more than 1 billion spent yearly in peace endeavors in the DRC amounts to throwing these invaluable resources in a bottomless hole!

NOTES

(1). See: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/conflits_inter_communautaires_dans_fizi_et_mwenga_plan_de_reponse_humanitaire_juillet_decembre_2019.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2019).

(2). The first figure is put forward by MONUCSO while the latter is given by local sources,

3 See : RDC : l’ONU juge « inacceptables » les discours de haine contre des Congolais rwandophones, LeMonde, 14 November 2019, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/11/14/rdc-l-onu-juge-inacceptables-les-discours-de-haine-contre-des-congolais-rwandophones_6019101_3212.html

4 MONUSCO Fact Sheet, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco (accessed on 24 September 2019).

(5). On this, see: Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, “The Bemba-Banyamulenge Case before the ICC: From Individual to Collective Criminal Responsibility,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 7 no 3 (2013): 476–496.

(6). Congo Research Group, Congo, Forgotten: The Numbers Behind Africa’s Longest Humanitarian Crisis, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, August 2019, https://kivusecurity.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/reports/28/KST%20biannual%20report%20August%2012%20%281%29.pdf (accessed on 25 September 2019).

(7). Jason Stearns and Christoph Vogel, ‘The Landscape of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo: Fragmented, politicized networks’, Kivu Security Tracker - December 2017.

(8). Drawn from recorded testimonies of local populations shared with the author.

(9). In English, FDLR stands for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, while CNRD is short for National Council for Renewal and Democracy.

(10). In English: Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi (Red-Tabara), National Liberation Forces-Nzabampema and Republican Forces of Burundi.

(11). UNSC, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2019/469, 7 June 2019, para 66-70.

12 See: UNHCR, Refugees and asylum seekers from DRC, at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc (accessed on 25 September 2019).

(13). UNHCR, Protection Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons Response in the Democratic Republic of Congo, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70500 (accessed on 25 September 2019).

(14). I elaborated on this in: Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda (2016), ‘Collective Victimization and Subjectivity in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Why Do Lasting Peace and Justice Remain Elusive?’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 23(2), pp.137-178.

(15). https://www.unocha.org/democratic-republic-congo-drc/about-ocha-drc (accessed on 25 September 2019).

(16). On this, see: Séverine Autesserre (2010), The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge University Press).

(17). Reference to former Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa Hendrik Verwoerd’s definition of what apartheid meant.

(18). Ndahinda, supra note 12. For more on the incidence of identity politics on violence in the DRC, see: Bosco Muchukiwa (2006), Territoires ethniques et territoires étatiques: pouvoirs locaux et conflits interethniques au Sud-Kivu (R.D. Congo), L’Harmattan; Thomas Turner (2007), The Congo Wars: Conflict, myth and reality, Zed Books, Koen Vlassenroot (2013), South Kivu: Identity, territory, and power in the eastern Congo, Rift Valley Institute (Rvi)/Usalama Project; Tatiana Carayannis, Koen Vlassenroot, Kasper Hoffmann and Aaron Pangburn (2018), Competing networks and political order in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a literature review on the logics of public authority and international intervention, DRC Synthesis Paper, LSE/Conflict Research Program; Alex Ntung (2019), ‘Dynamics of Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 43:2.